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Bureaucratic complexity and impacts of corruption in utilities

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  • Seim, Line Tndel
  • Sreide, Tina

Abstract

This paper explores how the relationship between bureaucratic complexity and corruption affects the performance in utilities. We observe considerable variation in the performance of the utilities across countries, even across countries which appear to be relatively similar. Our hypothesis is that corruption plays an important role in explaining this observed difference in performance. In particular, corruption coupled with a complex regulatory structure can have negative effects on performance. The analysis points at the importance of considering the institutional framework and institutional quality when introducing new bureaucratic procedures, as the same set of policy advice will work differently in different countries. We measure bureaucratic complexity by the number of procedures needed for starting a business from the Doing Business Database provided by the World Bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Seim, Line Tndel & Sreide, Tina, 2009. "Bureaucratic complexity and impacts of corruption in utilities," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 176-184, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:17:y:2009:i:2:p:176-184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zaman, Rafia & Brudermann, Thomas, 2018. "Energy governance in the context of energy service security: A qualitative assessment of the electricity system in Bangladesh," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 443-456.
    3. Estache, Antonio & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2010. "What Anti-Corruption Policy Can Learn from Theories of Sector Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Wisuttisak, Pornchai & Kim, Chul Ju & Rahim, Mia Mahmudur, 2021. "PPPs and challenges for competition law and policy in ASEAN," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 291-306.
    5. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Sharma, Chandan & Mitra, Arup, 2015. "Corruption, governance and firm performance: Evidence from Indian enterprises," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 835-851.
    7. Lakshmi, Geeta & Saha, Shrabani & Bhattarai, Keshab, 2021. "Does corruption matter for stock markets? The role of heterogeneous institutions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 386-400.

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