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Maintenance incentives under different infrastructure regimes

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  • Vickerman, Roger

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  • Vickerman, Roger, 2004. "Maintenance incentives under different infrastructure regimes," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 315-322, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:12:y:2004:i:4:p:315-322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael G. Pollitt & Andrew S. J. Smith, 2002. "The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail: was it really that bad?," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 23(4), pages 463-502, December.
    2. Caillaud, B. & Jullien, B. & Picard, P., 1996. "Hierarchical organization and incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 687-695, April.
    3. Buehler, Stefan & Schmutzler, Armin & Benz, Men-Andri, 2004. "Infrastructure quality in deregulated industries: is there an underinvestment problem?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 253-267, February.
    4. Stephen Glaister, 2002. "Uk Transport Policy 1997--2001," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 18(2), pages 154-186, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anupama Sen and Tooraj Jamasb, 2012. "Diversity in Unity: An Empirical Analysis of Electricity Deregulation in Indian States," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    2. Scheele, Ulrich, 2007. "Privatisierung, Liberalisierung und Deregulierung in netzgebundenen Infrastruktursektoren," Forschungs- und Sitzungsberichte der ARL: Aufsätze, in: Gust, Dieter (ed.), Wandel der Stromversorgung und räumliche Politik, volume 127, pages 35-67, ARL – Akademie für Raumentwicklung in der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft.
    3. Pittman, Russell, 2007. "Options for Restructuring the State-Owned Monopoly Railway," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 179-198, January.
    4. Ricardo Gonçalves & António Gomes, 2012. "Maintenance Incentives in Highway Concession Contracts," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 46(1), pages 99-122, January.
    5. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, March.
    6. Gibson, Stephen, 2005. "Incentivising operational performance on the UK rail infrastructure since 1996," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 222-229, September.
    7. Bernardino, João & Hrebícek, Zdenek & Marques, Carlos, 2010. "Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 59-73.

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