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Quality considerations in auctions for television franchises

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  • Cabizza, Mariella M.
  • De Fraja, Gianni

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  • Cabizza, Mariella M. & De Fraja, Gianni, 1998. "Quality considerations in auctions for television franchises," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 9-22, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:9-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    2. Cripps, Martin & Ireland, Norman, 1994. "The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(423), pages 316-326, March.
    3. Richard A. Posner, 1972. "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(1), pages 98-129, Spring.
    4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
    5. Oliver E. Williamson, 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies -- in General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 73-104, Spring.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    7. Simon Domberger & Julian Middleton, 1985. "Franchising in practice: the case of independent television in the UK," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 17-33, February.
    8. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hema Yoganarasimhan, 2016. "Estimation of Beauty Contest Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(1), pages 27-54, January.
    2. Antonio Estache & Jose-Luis Guasch & Atsushi Iimi & Lourdes Trujillo, 2009. "Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 41-71, September.
    3. Checchi, Daniele & De Fraja, Gianni & Verzillo, Stefano, 2014. "And the Winners Are... An Axiomatic Approach to Selection from a Set," IZA Discussion Papers 8344, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Daniele Checchi & Gianni De Fraja & Stefano Verzillo, 2014. "And the Winners Are… An Axiomatic Approach to Selection from a Set," Discussion Papers 14/05, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
    5. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2012. "Quality or Price? Evidence from ODA-Financed Public Procurement," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(4), pages 435-469, July.
    6. Daniele Checchi & Gianni De Fraja & Stefano Verzillo, 2018. "Selections from ordered sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 677-703, April.
    7. Nilssen,T. & Sorgard,L., 2001. "The TV industry : advertising and programming," Memorandum 18/2001, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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