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Interactions between natural resources and false democracy?

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  • Takaharu, Ishii

Abstract

A substantial political economy literature argues that it does not support a positive relationship between natural resources and autocracy. This study introduces a theoretical model and empirically estimates the relationship between natural resource endowment, democratic electoral systems, and electoral fraud. Electoral fraud and the introduction of a democratic electoral system have opposite positive and negative implications for democratization. This study examines the possibility that the opposite conditions are going on at the same time. In previous studies, indicators of Polity, a variable of institutional quality, have been used to identify not only the relationship between natural resources and institutions but also the relationship between natural resources and democratization.

Suggested Citation

  • Takaharu, Ishii, 2024. "Interactions between natural resources and false democracy?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:95:y:2024:i:c:s0301420724004999
    DOI: 10.1016/j.resourpol.2024.105132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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