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Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies

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  • Desha M Girod

    (Georgetown University, USA)

  • Megan A Stewart

    (Georgetown University, USA)

  • Meir R Walters

    (Georgetown University, USA)

Abstract

Why are some dictators more successful at demobilizing protest movements than others? Repression sometimes stamps out protest movements (Bahrain in 2011) but can also cause a backlash (Egypt and Tunisia in 2011), leading to regime change. This article argues that the effectiveness of repression in quelling protests varies depending upon the income sources of authoritarian regimes. Oil-rich autocracies are well equipped to contend with domestic and international criticism, and this gives them a greater capacity to quell protests through force. Because oil-poor dictators lack such ability to deal with criticism, repression is more likely to trigger a backlash of increased protests. The argument is supported by analysis of newly available data on mass protests from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset, which covers all countries (1945–2006). This article implies that publics respond strategically to repression, and tend to demobilize when the government is capable of continually employing repression with impunity.

Suggested Citation

  • Desha M Girod & Megan A Stewart & Meir R Walters, 2018. "Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 503-522, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:5:p:503-522
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894216651826
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    References listed on IDEAS

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