Visualization service investment strategies for a self-operated fresh agricultural product e-tailer

Motivated by the fact that numerous fresh agricultural product e-tailers utilize the visualization technology to improve service quality, this paper examines visualization service investment strategies for a fresh agricultural product e-tailer. A supply chain comprised of one manufacturer and one self-operated e-tailer is constructed. We first investigate two service investment strategies in the game theory model: the manufacturer investment and the e-tailer investment. Our analysis reveals that there are two investment cases in the supply chain: one member intends to the service investment (a “win-win†situation) and neither is willing to offer the service (a “lose-lose†dilemma). Then we extend the theory model. The impacts of consumer preference heterogeneity, demand uncertainty and consumer preference for the product quality difference on the investment strategies are explored by the method of multi-agent modelling. We find that: (i) when consumer preference heterogeneity is small, the e-tailer should invest in the service; (ii) if consumer preference or demand uncertainty is moderate, it is difficult to reach an agreement between two players. Further, the government subsidy factor is considered. The issue of how the government subsidy affects service investment strategies is discussed. In fact, it is not necessary to provide a subsidy all the time. Only when the free-riding behavior happens, the government should grant a moderate amount of subsidy to coordinate the supply chain members. An excessive subsidy hurts two sides’ benefits instead.