IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cir/cirwor/2022s-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Choosing to Pay More for Electricity: an experiment on the level of residential consumer cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-Olivier Pineau

Abstract

Reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions are two cornerstones of the fight against climate change. Signaling negative externalities of individual consumption on the environment is at the heart of public policies, and usually materializes through an increase in the price of polluting good and services. However, social resistance typically arises when such policies are implemented. In this experiment, we are interested in testing the context in which individuals would be willing to pay more for electricity. We use the situation of Québec (Canada), where low-cost hydropower sold below market value, akin to a consumption subsidy, leads to high residential consumption. Increasing regulated prices closer to their market value would result in a direct welfare gain and free some green energy, reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) in other sectors. The choice to pay more is a prisoner’s dilemma, and we find in this framework that giving clear and transparent information on the consequences of the price increase induces a majority of people to choose to pay more. In addition to the economic benefit of the public good, the presence of the environmental benefit increases contributions. Participants with a more severe budget constraint tend to contribute less. These results are encouraging for the development of efficient energy policies reducing GHG emissions. La réduction de la consommation d'énergie et des émissions de carbone sont deux pierres angulaires de la lutte contre le changement climatique. Signaler les externalités négatives de la consommation individuelle sur l'environnement est au cœur des politiques publiques, et se matérialise généralement par une augmentation du prix des biens et services polluants. Cependant, la résistance sociale se manifeste généralement lorsque de telles politiques sont mises en œuvre. Dans cette expérience, nous souhaitons tester le contexte dans lequel les individus seraient prêts à payer plus cher pour l'électricité. Nous utilisons la situation du Québec (Canada), où l'hydroélectricité à faible coût vendue en dessous de la valeur du marché, ce qui s'apparente à une subvention à la consommation, entraîne une forte consommation résidentielle. Une augmentation des prix réglementés plus proches de leur valeur de marché entraînerait un gain de bien-être direct et libérerait une partie de l'énergie verte, réduisant ainsi les gaz à effet de serre (GES) dans d'autres secteurs. Le choix de payer plus est un dilemme du prisonnier, et nous trouvons dans ce cadre que donner des informations claires et transparentes sur les conséquences de l'augmentation des prix incite une majorité de personnes à choisir de payer plus. En plus de l'avantage économique du bien public, la présence de l'avantage environnemental augmente les contributions. Les participants ayant une contrainte budgétaire plus sévère ont tendance à moins contribuer. Ces résultats sont encourageants pour le développement de politiques énergétiques efficaces réduisant les émissions de GES.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Olivier Pineau, 2022. "Choosing to Pay More for Electricity: an experiment on the level of residential consumer cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2022s-18, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2022s-18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2022s-18.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, April.
    2. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 4.
    3. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 2.
    4. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gachter, 2010. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 541-556, March.
    5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    6. Oerlemans, Leon A.G. & Chan, Kai-Ying & Volschenk, Jako, 2016. "Willingness to pay for green electricity: A review of the contingent valuation literature and its sources of error," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 875-885.
    7. Ma, Chunbo & Burton, Michael, 2016. "Warm glow from green power: Evidence from Australian electricity consumers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 106-120.
    8. Kotchen, Matthew J. & Moore, Michael R., 2007. "Private provision of environmental public goods: Household participation in green-electricity programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-16, January.
    9. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 6.
    10. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2008. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments," TWI Research Paper Series 27, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    11. Weimann, Joachim, 1994. "Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 185-200, June.
    12. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 7.
    13. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    14. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 3.
    15. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 8.
    16. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Experimental Economics Results," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 5.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 500-512.
    2. Ola Andersson & Marieke Huysentruyt & Topi Miettinen & Ute Stephan, 2017. "Person–Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(1), pages 73-96, January.
    3. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
    4. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    5. Ciril Bosch-Rosa & Thomas Meissner & Antoni Bosch-Domènech, 2018. "Cognitive bubbles," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 132-153, March.
    6. Pearson, Matthew & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-20.
    7. Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Elena Manzoni, 2020. "Zero-Intelligence vs. Human Agents: An Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter Markets of Varying Sizes," Working Papers 05/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    8. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 2017. "The role of frames, numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 64(3), pages 245-267, September.
    9. Christophe Bisière & Jean-Paul Décamps & Stefano Lovo, 2015. "Risk Attitude, Beliefs Updating, and the Information Content of Trades: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1378-1397, June.
    10. Oren Bar-Gill & Christoph Engel, 2016. "Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 477-495.
    11. Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2023. "The benefits of auctioneer competition: Merging auctions and adding auctioneers," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-038, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    12. Pfajfar, Damjan & Žakelj, Blaž, 2018. "Inflation Expectations And Monetary Policy Design: Evidence From The Laboratory," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(4), pages 1035-1075, June.
    13. Andrea Albertazzi & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2021. "Benchmarking information aggregation in experimental markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1500-1516, October.
    14. Jiří Špalek & Zuzana Berná, 2011. "Threshold Effectiveness in Contributing to the Public Goods: Experiments Involving Czech Students," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(3), pages 250-267.
    15. Pfajfar, Damjan & Žakelj, Blaž, 2014. "Experimental evidence on inflation expectation formation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 147-168.
    16. Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Selten, Reinhard & Wiesen, Daniel, 2011. "How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour--An experimental investigation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 637-646, July.
    17. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
    18. Rustichini, Aldo & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Moral hypocrisy, power and social preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 10-24.
    19. Ronald M. Harstad, 2014. "Efficiency Measurement via Revealed Thresholds, Without Knowing Valuations," Working Papers 1405, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 01 Mar 2016.
    20. Englmaier, Florian & Strasser, Sebastian & Winter, Joachim, 2014. "Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 185-203.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public good; Voluntary environmental action; Green electricity; Bien public; action environnementale volontaire; électricité verte;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2022s-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciranca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.