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Group reactions to dishonesty

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  • Keck, Steffen

Abstract

Groups and individuals were compared for their willingness to incur financial costs in order to punish dishonest behavior by others. Study 1 demonstrated that dishonesty was punished more often by groups than by individuals and that groups’ higher willingness to punish dishonesty was mediated by stronger negative affect. Study 2 provided evidence that the increase in negative affect in groups was driven by exposure to other group members’ negative feelings and opinions during group discussions. Overall, the results suggest that being part of a group increases negative emotions toward dishonest others and leads to a greater willingness to engage in costly punishment.

Suggested Citation

  • Keck, Steffen, 2014. "Group reactions to dishonesty," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.12.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Behnk, Sascha & Hao, Li & Reuben, Ernesto, 2022. "Shifting normative beliefs: On why groups behave more antisocially than individuals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    2. Steffen Keck & Wenjie Tang, 2018. "Gender Composition and Group Confidence Judgment: The Perils of All-Male Groups," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(12), pages 5877-5898, December.

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