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Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times

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  • Vinogradov, Dmitri

Abstract

Unclear bailout policy, underinvestment and calls for greater responsibility by bankers are some of the observations from the recent financial crisis. The paper explains underinvestment as an inefficient equilibrium. Under ambiguous bailout policy agents suffer from a lack of information about the insolvency resolution methods. The beliefs of bankers regarding whether an insolvent bank is liquidated, may differ from those of depositors even if bankers and depositors possess absolutely symmetric information about the economy. This disrupts the flow of funds through the banking channel if the investment climate is characterized by high aggregate risk. The paper suggests policy implications aimed at a reduction of the anxiety of agents and at aligning their beliefs to restore efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Vinogradov, Dmitri, 2012. "Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1459-1481.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:31:y:2012:i:6:p:1459-1481
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2012.02.011
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bank for International Settlements, 2011. "Global liquidity - concept, measurement and policy implications," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 45.
    2. Dmitri Vinogradov & Yousef Makhlouf, 2017. "Signaling Probabilities in Ambiguity: on the impact of vague news," Working Papers 2017_12, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    3. Lien, Donald & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey), 2017. "Production and hedging with optimism and pessimism under ambiguity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 122-135.
    4. Marcin Jerzy Michalski & Michael Bowe & Olga Kolokolova, 2016. "Systemic risk, interbank market contagion, and the lender of last resort function," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Combining micro and macro data for financial stability analysis, volume 41, Bank for International Settlements.
    5. Dmitri V. Vinogradov & Elena V. Shadrina, 2018. "Discouragement through incentives," Working Papers 2018_05, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/jpcu0knbl80rpibin9slrlrlb is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of bank bailouts and constructive ambiguity," CEPR Discussion Papers 8953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Dmitri Vinogradov & Yousef Makhlouf, 2021. "Signaling probabilities in ambiguity: who reacts to vague news?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 371-404, May.
    9. Driouchi, Tarik & So, Raymond H.Y. & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 2020. "Investor ambiguity, systemic banking risk and economic activity: The case of too-big-to-fail," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    10. Vinogradov, Dmitri & Makhlouf, Yousef, 2021. "Two faces of financial systems: Provision of services versus shock-smoothing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    11. Dmitri V. Vinogradov & Elena V. Shadrina, 2018. "Discouragement through incentives," Working Papers 2018-05, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    12. Michael J. Lamla & Dmitri V. Vinogradov, 2021. "Is the Word of a Gentleman as Good as His Tweet? Policy communications of the Bank of England," Working Paper Series in Economics 403, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    13. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/jpcu0knbl80rpibin9slrlrlb is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Marina Doroshenko & Ian Miles & Dmitri Vinogradov, 2013. "Knowledge Intensive Business Services As Generators Of Innovations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 12/STI/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Nijskens, Rob, 2014. "A sheep in wolf’s clothing: Can a central bank appear tougher than it is?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 94-103.
    16. Andreas Eisl, 2020. "The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules," Working Papers hal-03053976, HAL.
    17. Giancarlo Giudici & Alistair Milne & Dmitri Vinogradov, 2020. "Cryptocurrencies: market analysis and perspectives," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(1), pages 1-18, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank bailouts; Constructive ambiguity; Policy communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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