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Why do financial market experts misperceive future monetary policy decisions?

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  • Schmidt, Sandra
  • Nautz, Dieter

Abstract

This paper investigates why financial market experts misperceive the interest rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor-rule-type reaction function of the ECB, we use qualitative survey data on expectations about the future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of individual interest rate forecast errors. Based on a panel random coefficient model, we show that financial experts have systematically misperceived the ECB's interest rate rule. However, although experts tend to overestimate the impact of inflation on future interest rates, perceptions of monetary policy have become more accurate since clarification of the ECB's monetary policy strategy in May 2003. We find that this improved communication has reduced disagreement over the ECB's response to expected inflation during the financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt, Sandra & Nautz, Dieter, 2010. "Why do financial market experts misperceive future monetary policy decisions?," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-045, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10045
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank communication; Interest rate forecasts; Survey expectations; Panel random coefficient model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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