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Managerial structure in the hedge fund industry

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Yuhao
  • Kuang, Huan
  • Liang, Bing

Abstract

This paper provides the first study on how management structure influences hedge fund performance and risk. We document that hedge funds less tied to traditional assets often choose solo management structures. Solo-managed funds outperform team-managed funds, exhibit better skills in market return, volatility, and crisis timing, and demonstrate greater activity in beta management, but have higher idiosyncratic and tail risks. They are also less likely to be liquidated, with fund flows less performance sensitive. Using a sample of switched funds, we find that fund performance, assets, and risk correlate with the management structure switching decision.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yuhao & Kuang, Huan & Liang, Bing, 2024. "Managerial structure in the hedge fund industry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:58:y:2024:i:c:s1042957324000172
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101089
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hedge funds; Managerial structure; Performance; Risk-taking; Fund flows;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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