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Regulatory transparency and the alignment of private and public enforcement: Evidence from the public disclosure of SEC comment letters

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  • Hutton, Amy
  • Shu, Susan
  • Zheng, Xin

Abstract

Does enhanced regulatory transparency facilitate alignment of private and public enforcement? Utilizing the SEC's 2004 decision to publicly disclose its comment letters, we explore the actions of the SEC and shareholder litigants. We find the two parties converge more on enforcement targets after the public disclosure. The increased alignment is attributable to public scrutiny of SEC oversight enhancing regulator incentives and reducing regulatory capture, and to shareholder plaintiffs gaining information previously accessible only by regulators, enabling litigants to identify cases with “merit.” These findings suggest regulatory transparency enhances the complementarity of public and private enforcement, potentially improving enforcement outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hutton, Amy & Shu, Susan & Zheng, Xin, 2022. "Regulatory transparency and the alignment of private and public enforcement: Evidence from the public disclosure of SEC comment letters," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 297-321.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:145:y:2022:i:1:p:297-321
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.07.011
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sec comment letters; Shareholder litigation; Regulatory transparency; Enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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