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The effect of minority veto rights on controller pay tunneling

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  • Fried, Jesse M.
  • Kamar, Ehud
  • Yafeh, Yishay

Abstract

A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing rent extraction by controllers. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are often insufficient, some jurisdictions give minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions. To assess these rights’ effectiveness, we exploit a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders veto rights over related-party transactions, including the pay of controllers and their relatives (“controller executives”). We find that the reform curbed controller-executive pay and led some controller executives to resign or go with little or no pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would be rejected. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool.

Suggested Citation

  • Fried, Jesse M. & Kamar, Ehud & Yafeh, Yishay, 2020. "The effect of minority veto rights on controller pay tunneling," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 777-788.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:138:y:2020:i:3:p:777-788
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.06.015
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    Cited by:

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    2. Cai, Guowei & Hsu, Po-Hsuan & Xu, Xinyi & Zhou, Tong & Zhu, Yadian, 2023. "The bright and dark sides of minority shareholder protection: Evidence from the separate vote counts disclosure rule in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    3. Hunold, Matthias & Petrishcheva, Vasilisa, 2022. "Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership," DICE Discussion Papers 391, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Lu, Jing & Qiu, Yuhang, 2024. "Does minority shareholder activism reduce stock idiosyncratic risk?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    5. Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Feng, Yumei & Pan, Yuying & Ho, Kung-Cheng & Liu, Guanchun, 2023. "Corporate governance of weak stakeholders: Minority investors and investment efficiency," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    7. Wenzhou Li & Liang Chen & Pengfei Sheng, 2022. "The tone from above: Does tunnelling by ultimate owners impinge on the relations between managerial compensation and earnings management?," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 825-847, December.
    8. Lin, Jing & Li, Fang & Zheng, Steven Xiaofan & Zhou, Mingshan, 2023. "Minority shareholder voting and dividend policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    9. Zhang, Qianqian & Jiang, Chunzi & Liu, Baohua & Chan, Kam C., 2024. "Small but salient: Minority shareholders’ innovation attention in interactive online platforms and corporate innovation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(PB).
    10. Yinju Nie & Ming Jia, 2021. "The power of crowds: can minority shareholder activism promote management earnings forecast accuracy," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(5), pages 6333-6385, December.
    11. Luis Alfonso Dau & Randall Morck & Bernard Yin Yeung, 2021. "Business groups and the study of international business: A Coasean synthesis and extension," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(2), pages 161-211, March.
    12. Efrat Dressler & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2023. "Doing the Right Thing? The Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(4), pages 1089-1112, April.
    13. Matthias Hunold & Vasilisa Petrishcheva, 2022. "Foreclosure and Tunneling with Partial Vertical Ownership," CEPA Discussion Papers 57, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    14. Huang, Xue & Wang, Zhibin, 2024. "Does minority shareholder activism impede corporate default risk? Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    15. Liu, Kai & Wang, Jiang & Liu, Liqun & Huang, Yingjun, 2023. "Mixed-ownership reform of SOEs and ESG performance: Evidence from China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1618-1641.
    16. Fried, Jesse M. & Spamann, Holger, 2020. "Cheap-stock tunneling around preemptive rights," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 353-370.
    17. Haidong Li & Ziming Qian & Shanyong Wang & Jing Wang & Qian Wang, 2023. "Do green concerns promote corporate green innovation? Evidence from Chinese stock exchange interactive platforms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1786-1801, April.
    18. Lu, Qiaoshan & Xiang, Cheng & Li, Bingxiang & Feng, Lixuan, 2023. "Non-controlling shareholders' governance participation and corporate misconduct: Evidence from voting in general meetings," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Controlling shareholders; Executive compensation; Related-party transactions; Shareholder voting; Tunneling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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