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Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt

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  • Campbell, T. Colin
  • Galpin, Neal
  • Johnson, Shane A.

Abstract

We use firm and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics motivated by optimal contracting theory to estimate optimal CEO relative debt-equity incentive ratios. Equity values rise as firms adjust CEO incentive ratios toward their predicted optimums, whether that increases or decreases the relative incentive ratio. Debt values rise as firms adjust ratios upward and do not fall as they adjust them downward. Our predicted optimums explain changes in equity and debt values better than a model in which firms simply match CEO inside debt-equity ratios to firm debt-equity ratios. The results suggest important cross-sectional differences in firms’ optimal inside debt policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Campbell, T. Colin & Galpin, Neal & Johnson, Shane A., 2016. "Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 336-352.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:119:y:2016:i:2:p:336-352
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.003
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    Cited by:

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    5. Nilakshi Borah & Hui Liang James & Jung Chul Park, 2020. "Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 159-203, January.
    6. Nguyen, Phuong L. & Galpin, Neal & Twite, Garry, 2022. "New active blockholders and adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    7. Cheng-Few Lee & Chengru Hu & Maggie Foley, 2021. "Differential risk effect of inside debt, CEO compensation diversification, and firm investment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 505-543, February.
    8. Kyoungwon Mo & Kyung Jin Park & YoungJin Kim, 2019. "The Role of Institutional Investors in the Sustainable CEO Compensation Structure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(19), pages 1-21, October.
    9. Gurmeet S. Bhabra & Harjeet S. Bhabra & Ashrafee T. Hossain, 2022. "CEO inside debt and the acquisition of private targets," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2163-2202, June.
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    11. Amanj Mohamed Ahmed & Nabard Abdallah Sharif & Muhammad Nawzad Ali & István Hágen, 2023. "Effect of Firm Size on the Association between Capital Structure and Profitability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-17, July.
    12. Dayani, Arash, 2022. "CEO inside debt and mutual fund investment decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    13. Salama, Feras M. & Samet, Anis, 2022. "The impact of CEO inside debt on the coinsurance effect and excess value of diversification," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 58-74.
    14. Alderson, Michael J. & Halford, Joseph T. & Sibilkov, Valeriy, 2020. "An examination of the wealth effects of share repurchases on bondholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inside debt; Pensions; Executive compensation; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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