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Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games

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  • Aoyagi, Masaki

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  • Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:71:y:1996:i:2:p:378-393
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    Cited by:

    1. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger, 2007. "On the size and structure of group cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 68-89, July.
    2. Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2015, David K. Levine.
    3. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
    4. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    5. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Michiel Gerritse, 2010. "Policy competition and agglomeration: a local government view," Working Papers 2010/31, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    7. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
    8. Shota Fujishima, 2015. "The emergence of cooperation through leadership," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-36, February.
    9. Gerritse, Michiel, 2014. "Competing for firms under agglomeration: Policy timing and welfare," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 48-57.
    10. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000640, UCLA Department of Economics.
    12. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    13. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    14. Michiel Gerritse, 2010. "Policy competition and agglomeration: a local government view," Working Papers 2010/31, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    15. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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