Are incentives against economic justice?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004.
"Room assignment-rent division: A market approach,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 515-538, June.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2002. "Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach," Game Theory and Information 0202003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Feb 2004.
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-954, July.
- Sobel, Joel, 1981. "Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 597-619, May.
- Thomson, William, 1988. "The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(2), pages 101-127.
- Carmen Beviá, 2010.
"Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 209-222, March.
- Carmen Beviá, 2009. "Manipulation Games in Economics with Indivisible Goods," Working Papers 371, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Competitive Fair Division," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April.
- Varian, Hal R., 1974.
"Equity, envy, and efficiency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
- H. R. Varian, 1973. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency," Working papers 115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Eric S. Maskin, 1987. "On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 11, pages 341-349, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sobel, Joel, 2001. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 196-215, October.
- William Thomson, 1984. "The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 447-460.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996.
"Toward Natural Implementation,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-980, November.
- Saijo, T. & Tatamitani, Y. & Yamato, T., 1994. "Toward Natural Implementation," ISER Discussion Paper 0340, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tadenuma Koichi & Thomson William, 1995. "Games of Fair Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 191-204, May.
- Kibris, Ozgur, 2002.
"Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 91-110, April.
- KIBRIS, Özgür, 2002. "Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1546, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
- Alkan, Ahmet, 1994. "Monotonicity and Envyfree Assignments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(4), pages 605-616, May.
- Otani, Yoshihiko & Sicilian, Joseph, 1982. "Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-68, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- , & , & ,, 2014.
"Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
- Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Working Papers 2010:16, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2013.
- ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Cahiers de recherche 18-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Cahiers de recherche 2010-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017.
"Sharing an increase of the rent fairly,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 59-80, January.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2015. "Sharing an increase of the rent fairly," Working Papers 20151201-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2022. "A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 93-118, July.
- Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers, 2022.
"An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities,"
International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 50-60, March.
- Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2021:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016.
"The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 115-131.
- Alexander L. Brown & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2014. "The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems," Working Papers 20140918-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
- Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017.
"Divide and compromise,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 100-110.
- Rodrigo A. Velez & Antonio Nicolo, 2016. "Divide and compromise," Working Papers 20160710-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Tommy ANDERSSON & Lars EHLERS, 2013.
"An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities,"
Cahiers de recherche
17-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars, 2013. "An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 2013-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Andersson , Tommy & Ehlers, Lars, 2014. "An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2014:35, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017. "Equitable rent division," Working Papers 20170818-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2014.
"Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-49.
- Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Sep 2013.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2015. "Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1114-1129.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2023. "Equitable rent division on a soft budget," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-14.
- Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2017.
"Incentives and justice for sequencing problems,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 239-264, August.
- Mitra, Manipushpak & De, Parikshit, 2015. "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," MPRA Paper 65447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Azrieli, Yaron & Shmaya, Eran, 2014. "Rental harmony with roommates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 128-137.
- Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012.
"Let them cheat!,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
- Rodrigo Velez & William Thomson, 2009. "Let them cheat!," RCER Working Papers 552, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Nanyang Bu, 2016. "Joint misrepresentation with bribes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 115-125, January.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2019. "Expressive mechanisms for equitable rent division on a budget," Papers 1902.02935, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2020.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
- Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012.
"Let them cheat!,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
- Rodrigo Velez & William Thomson, 2009. "Let them cheat!," RCER Working Papers 552, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2015. "Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1114-1129.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017. "Equitable rent division," Working Papers 20170818-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Nicolò, Antonio & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2017.
"Divide and compromise,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 100-110.
- Rodrigo A. Velez & Antonio Nicolo, 2016. "Divide and compromise," Working Papers 20160710-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2017.
"Sharing an increase of the rent fairly,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 59-80, January.
- Rodrigo A. Velez, 2015. "Sharing an increase of the rent fairly," Working Papers 20151201-001, Texas A&M University, Department of Economics.
- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
- Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 549-563, June.
- Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka & Thomson, William, 2024. "Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
- Azrieli, Yaron & Shmaya, Eran, 2014. "Rental harmony with roommates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 128-137.
- Gomez, Juan Camilo, 2006. "Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 254-263, November.
- Azacis, Helmuts, 2008.
"Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 140-154, January.
- Helmuts Azacis, 2004. "Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 623.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Azacis, Helmuts, 2005. "Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Maniquet, François, 2008.
"Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
- Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers 0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- MANIQUET, François, 2009. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2169, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2009.
"Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 227-245, August.
- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness," Working Papers 2006:10, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 253-258, February.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016. "Fairness and externalities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
- , & ,, 2015.
"Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
- Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2012. "Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0852, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Meertens, Marc & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans, 2002. "Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 223-233, December.
- Carmen Beviá, 2010.
"Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 209-222, March.
- Carmen Beviá, 2009. "Manipulation Games in Economics with Indivisible Goods," Working Papers 371, Barcelona School of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Efficiency Fairness Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair solutions Implementation Indivisible goods Manipulation Mechanism design No-envy;Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:326-345. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.