The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002.
"On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 120-140, October.
- Oscar Volij, 1999. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Economic theory and game theory 010, Oscar Volij.
- Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Churkin, Andrey & Bialek, Janusz & Pozo, David & Sauma, Enzo & Korgin, Nikolay, 2021. "Review of Cooperative Game Theory applications in power system expansion planning," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
- Sanchez, Francisco Sanchez, 2002. "About inheritance distribution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 297-309, July.
- Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
- Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Kibris, Ozgur, 2002.
"Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 91-110, April.
- KIBRIS, Özgür, 2002. "Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: pure exchange and public good economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1546, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2015. "Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1114-1129.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001.
"Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, "undated". "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 2016.
"Nash bargaining and risk aversion,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-9.
- Rausser, Gordon C & Simon, Leo K, 2016. "Nash bargaining and risk aversion," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt3x2173v3, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
- Gomez, Juan Camilo, 2006. "Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 254-263, November.
- Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
- Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William, 2012.
"Let them cheat!,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 948-963.
- Rodrigo Velez & William Thomson, 2009. "Let them cheat!," RCER Working Papers 552, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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