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A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation

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  • Chu, Leon Yang
  • Sappington, David E.M.

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  • Chu, Leon Yang & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 745-753, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:137:y:2007:i:1:p:745-753
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    4. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1995. "Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 675-689, Winter.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1992. "Cost Padding, Auditing and Collusion," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 25-26, pages 205-226.
    6. repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:10 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Chu, Leon Yang & Sappington, David E.M., 2009. "Procurement contracts: Theory vs. practice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 51-59, January.
    2. Xin Yun & Hao Liu & Yi Li & Kin Keung Lai, 2023. "Contract design under asymmetric demand information for sustainable supply chain practices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 324(1), pages 1429-1459, May.
    3. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
    4. Basak Kalkanci & Kay-Yut Chen & Feryal Erhun, 2011. "Contract Complexity and Performance Under Asymmetric Demand Information: An Experimental Evaluation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 689-704, April.
    5. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316, June.

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