Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005.
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CARF F-Series CARF-F-010, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005.
"Large Market Design in Dominance,"
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CARF-F-036, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Large Market Design in Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-346, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
- Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2022. "Ambiguous Social Choice Functions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 660, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
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- Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2011.
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Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 255-282, February.
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- Alexander Reffgen, 2011. "Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 39-59, June.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
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- Kutlu, Levent, 2007. "Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 255-258, May.
- Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
- Wolitzky, Alexander, 2009. "Fully sincere voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 720-735, November.
- Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Choosers as extension axioms," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 375-384, October.
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