IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v122y2023ics0095069623000724.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Global climate governance in the light of geoengineering: A shot in the dark?

Author

Listed:
  • Finus, Michael
  • Furini, Francesco

Abstract

Solar radiation management (SRM), as one form of geoengineering, has been proposed as a last exit strategy to address global warming. Even though SRM is expected to be cheap, it may be risky and associated with high collateral damages. We analyze how SRM affects equilibrium mitigation strategies, the governance architecture of a climate agreement and whether and how signatories to a climate agreement can avoid the deployment of geoengineering, either by all or a subgroup of countries. We show under which conditions the threat to deploy geoengineering can stabilize a large climate agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco, 2023. "Global climate governance in the light of geoengineering: A shot in the dark?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:122:y:2023:i:c:s0095069623000724
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102854
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069623000724
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102854?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans‐Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, September.
    2. Moreno-Cruz, Juan B., 2015. "Mitigation and the geoengineering threat," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 248-263.
    3. Daniel Bodansky, 2013. "The who, what, and wherefore of geoengineering governance," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 539-551, December.
    4. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    5. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "The theory of international environmental agreements," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1516, Elsevier.
    6. Gernot Klepper & Wilfried Rickels, 2014. "Climate Engineering: Economic Considerations and Research Challenges," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 270-289.
    7. Martin L. Weitzman, 2015. "A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1049-1068, October.
    8. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521542548, October.
    9. Lazkano, Itziar & Marrouch, Walid & Nkuiya, Bruno, 2016. "Adaptation to climate change: how does heterogeneity in adaptation costs affect climate coalitions?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(6), pages 812-838, December.
    10. Heyen, Daniel & Horton, Joshua & Moreno-Cruz, Juan, 2019. "Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 153-177.
    11. Todd Sandler, 2018. "Collective action and geoengineering," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 105-125, March.
    12. Scott Barrett, 2014. "Solar Geoengineering’s Brave New World: Thoughts on the Governance of an Unprecedented Technology," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 249-269.
    13. Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "Geoengineering and global warming: a strategic perspective," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 375-389, November.
    14. Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 160-204.
    15. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    16. Bayramoglu, Basak & Finus, Michael & Jacques, Jean-François, 2018. "Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 101-113.
    17. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    18. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini, 2022. "Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark?," Graz Economics Papers 2022-02, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    19. Rickels, Wilfried & Quaas, Martin F. & Ricke, Katharine & Quaas, Johannes & Moreno-Cruz, Juan & Smulders, Sjak, 2020. "Who turns the global thermostat and by how much?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    20. Moreno-Cruz, Juan B. & Smulders, Sjak, 2017. "Revisiting the economics of climate change: the role of geoengineering," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 212-224.
    21. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2021. "The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    22. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521834773, October.
    23. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    24. Adrien Fabre & Gernot Wagner, 2020. "Availability of risky geoengineering can make an ambitious climate mitigation agreement more likely," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-4, December.
    25. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini, 2022. "Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering: A Shot in the Dark?," Graz Economics Papers 2022-02, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    2. Irina Bakalova & Mariia Belaia, 2023. "Stability of Efficient International Agreements on Solar Geoengineering," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 86(3), pages 673-712, November.
    3. Piergiuseppe Pezzoli & Johannes Emmerling & Massimo Tavoni, 2023. "SRM on the table: the role of geoengineering for the stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(10), pages 1-21, October.
    4. Juan Moreno-Cruz & Anthony Harding, 2022. "A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10172, CESifo.
    5. Moreno-Cruz, Juan & Harding, Anthony, 2023. "A Unifying Theory of Foreign Intervention in Domestic Climate Policy," RFF Working Paper Series 23-24, Resources for the Future.
    6. Adrien Fabre & Gernot Wagner, 2020. "Availability of risky geoengineering can make an ambitious climate mitigation agreement more likely," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 7(1), pages 1-4, December.
    7. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    8. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    9. Karp, Larry & Sakamoto, Hiroaki, 2021. "Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    10. Heyen, Daniel & Horton, Joshua & Moreno-Cruz, Juan, 2019. "Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 153-177.
    11. Kováč, Eugen & Schmidt, Robert C., 2021. "A simple dynamic climate cooperation model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    12. Emmerling, Johannes & Tavoni, Massimo, 2017. "Quantifying Non-cooperative Climate Engineering," MITP: Mitigation, Innovation and Transformation Pathways 266289, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    13. Todd Sandler, 2018. "Collective action and geoengineering," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 105-125, March.
    14. Muhammet A. Bas & Aseem Mahajan, 2020. "Contesting the climate," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 162(4), pages 1985-2002, October.
    15. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Péreau, 2017. "Multilateral versus sequential negotiations over climate change," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 365-387.
    16. Bayramoglu, Basak & Finus, Michael & Jacques, Jean-François, 2018. "Climate agreements in a mitigation-adaptation game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 101-113.
    17. Todd Sandler, 2017. "Environmental cooperation: contrasting international environmental agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 345-364.
    18. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2021. "The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    19. Achim Hagen & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2021. "National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 405-425, September.
    20. Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mitigation-geoengineering game; Solar radiation management; Collateral damages; Climate agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:122:y:2023:i:c:s0095069623000724. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.