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Externality and organizational choice in franchising

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  • Dnes, Antony
  • Garoupa, Nuno

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  • Dnes, Antony & Garoupa, Nuno, 2005. "Externality and organizational choice in franchising," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 139-149.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:57:y:2005:i:2:p:139-149
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maness, Robert, 1996. "Incomplete contracts and the choice between vertical integration and franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 101-115, October.
    2. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    3. Norton, Seth W, 1988. "An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(2), pages 197-218, April.
    4. Gallini, Nancy T & Lutz, Nancy A, 1992. "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 471-501, October.
    5. Chong‐En Bai & Zhigang Tao, 2000. "Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public‐Good Provision," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 85-113, March.
    6. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 241-241.
    8. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2005. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 131-150, Spring.
    9. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    10. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    11. Lafontaine, Francine, 1993. "Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 256-289, October.
    12. James A. Brickley, 2002. "Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 511-535, October.
    13. Dnes, Antony W, 1993. "A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 367-393, June.
    14. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 84-113, April.
    15. Rose, David C., 2002. "Marginal productivity analysis in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 355-363, August.
    16. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 565-602, May.
    17. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-526, October.
    18. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    19. Williamson, Oliver E, 1981. "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1537-1568, December.
    20. Brickley, James A, 1999. "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 745-774, October.
    21. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
    22. O. Brown Jr., William, 1998. "Transaction costs, corporate hierarchies, and the theory of franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 319-329, August.
    23. Lafontaine, Francine & Slade, Margaret E., 1996. "Retail contracting and costly monitoring: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 923-932, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bürkle, Thomas & Posselt, Thorsten, 2008. "Franchising as a plural system: A risk-based explanation," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 39-47.
    2. Josef Windsperger, 2013. "The governance of franchising networks," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Brookes, Maureen & Roper, Angela, 2012. "Realising plural-form benefits in international hotel chains," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 580-591.
    4. Cliquet, Gérard & Pénard, Thierry, 2012. "Plural form franchise networks: A test of Bradach’s model," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 159-167.
    5. Hendrikse, G.W.J. & Jiang, T., 2005. "Plural Form in Franchising: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-090-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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