Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.005
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Berthélemy Michel & Bonev Petyo & Dussaux Damien & Söderberg Magnus, 2019.
"Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment,"
Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(1), pages 1-30, February.
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- Michel Berthélemy & Petyo Bonev & Damien Dussaux & Magnus Söderberg, 2018. "Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment," Post-Print hal-01829558, HAL.
- Michael Collins, J. & Urban, Carly, 2014. "The dark side of sunshine: Regulatory oversight and status quo bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 470-486.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.
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More about this item
Keywords
Regulation; Information; Experimentation; L51; D82; D83;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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