Tom Wilkening
Personal Details
First Name: | Tom |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Wilkening |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pwi234 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
http://www.tomwilkening.com | |
Affiliation
Department of Economics
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australiahttp://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/
RePEc:edi:demelau (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Gharad Bryan & Jonathan de Quidt & Tom Wilkening & Nitin Yadav, 2017.
"Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6557, CESifo.
- Bryan, Gharad & Wilkening, Tom & de Quidt, Jonathan & Yadav, Nitin, 2017. "Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 12136, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015.
"The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation,"
ECON - Working Papers
189, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
- Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5300, CESifo.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Post-Print halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014.
"Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation,"
IZA Discussion Papers
8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4948, CESifo.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014.
"Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms,"
ECON - Working Papers
171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
- Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091.
- Peter Bardsley & Nisvan Erkal & Nikos Nikiforakis & Tom Wilkening, 2013. "Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity and Rat Races: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00811972, HAL.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Charles N. Noussair & Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1120, The University of Melbourne.
- Peter Bardsley & Nisvan Erkal & Nikos Nikiforakis & Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1122, The University of Melbourne, revised 2011.
- Patrick Warren & Tom Wilkening, 2010. "Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1113, The University of Melbourne.
- Michael Kremer, Tom Wilkening, 2010.
"Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
1114, The University of Melbourne.
- Michael Kremer & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases?," Working Paper 145976, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2010.
"The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive E ects of Power,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
1115, The University of Melbourne.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2013. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1325-1359, June.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power," ECON - Working Papers 099, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Herz, Holger & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," IZA Discussion Papers 7030, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 4021, CESifo.
- Tom Wilkening, 2009. "The Informational Properties of Institutions: An Experimental Study of Persistence in Markets with Certification," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1087, The University of Melbourne.
Articles
- Ingrid Burfurd & Tom Wilkening, 2022. "Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 557-592, April.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021.
"Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
- Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
- Marcellin Martinie & Tom Wilkening & Piers D L Howe, 2020. "Using meta-predictions to identify experts in the crowd when past performance is unknown," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-11, April.
- Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018.
"The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
- Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation," ECON - Working Papers 189, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5300, CESifo.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Post-Print halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Ingrid Burfurd & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 15-28, July.
- Wilkening, Tom, 2016. "Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 193-215.
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 857-897, December.
- Bardsley, Peter & Erkal, Nisvan & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Wilkening, Tom, 2013. "Recursive contracts, firm longevity, and rat races: An experimental analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 217-231.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2013.
"The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1325-1359, June.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power," ECON - Working Papers 099, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2010. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive E ects of Power," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1115, The University of Melbourne.
- Fehr, Ernst & Herz, Holger & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," IZA Discussion Papers 7030, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Holger Herz & Tom Wilkening, 2012. "The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 4021, CESifo.
- Nikiforakis, Nikos & Noussair, Charles N. & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 797-807.
- Warren, Patrick L. & Wilkening, Tom S., 2012. "Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 840-856.
- Simon Loertscher & Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Auctions and Economic Design," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 44(3), pages 347-354, September.
- Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 87(276), pages 178-180, March.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
Access and download statistics for all items
Rankings
This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
- Closeness measure in co-authorship network
Co-authorship network on CollEc
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 11 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (10) 2011-04-30 2011-09-05 2012-12-22 2013-01-26 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2015-04-11 2015-05-02 2017-07-23 2017-11-05. Author is listed
- NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (8) 2011-04-30 2011-09-05 2012-12-22 2013-01-26 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2015-04-11 2015-05-02. Author is listed
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (6) 2012-12-22 2013-01-26 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2015-04-11 2015-05-02. Author is listed
- NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (5) 2011-09-05 2012-12-22 2013-01-26 2015-04-11 2015-05-02. Author is listed
- NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (4) 2012-12-22 2013-01-26 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2015-04-11 2015-05-02
- NEP-AGR: Agricultural Economics (2) 2017-07-23 2017-11-05
- NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2012-12-22 2013-01-26
- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2011-09-05
- NEP-CUL: Cultural Economics (1) 2014-02-21
- NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2017-11-05
- NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (1) 2011-09-05
- NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2011-04-30
- NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-09-08
- NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2011-09-05
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2015-05-02
- NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2011-04-30
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