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Can racially unbiased police perpetuate long-run discrimination?

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  • Bunzel, Helle
  • Marcoul, Philippe

Abstract

We develop a stylized dynamic model of highway policing in which a non-racist police officer is given incentives to arrest criminals, but faces a per stop cost of stop which increases when the racial mix of the persons he stops di.ers from the racial mix of the population.We define the fair jail rate to be when the racial composition of the jail population is identical to the racial composition of the criminal population.We study the long-term racial composition of the jail population when the policeman decides whom to stop based only on his last period successes in arresting criminals.The study of this "imperfect recall" case shows, consistent with empirical findings, that the long term racial jail rate is always greater than the fair one and the gap increases when incentives are made more powerful.We then study this rate when policemen are provided with data concerning conviction rates for each race, similar to the data which is now being collected in many states.In this case, we find that although the long term rate is still greater than the fair rate, it is smaller than that obtained in the imperfect recall case.We discuss the desirability of such data collection and dissemination of information among police officers.
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  • Bunzel, Helle & Marcoul, Philippe, 2008. "Can racially unbiased police perpetuate long-run discrimination?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 36-47, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:1:p:36-47
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    Cited by:

    1. Daskalova, Vessela, 2018. "Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 238-252.
    2. Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2004. "Using Hit Rate Tests to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita," NBER Working Papers 10947, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rubén Hernández-Murillo & John Knowles, 2004. "Racial Profiling Or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests In Aggregate Data," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 959-989, August.
    4. Olugbenga Ajilore & Shane Shirey, 2017. "Do #AllLivesMatter? An Evaluation of Race and Excessive Use of Force by Police," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(2), pages 201-212, June.
    5. Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2005. "Using Hit Rates to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

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