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Finding and retaining the dominant strategy: The second-price, English and `sealed offer' English auctions

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  • Bernard, John C.

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  • Bernard, John C., 2006. "Finding and retaining the dominant strategy: The second-price, English and `sealed offer' English auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 553-561, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:60:y:2006:i:4:p:553-561
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    2. Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December.
    3. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-454, March.
    4. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019. "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 51-74.
    2. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion, 2019. "How the auction design influences procurement prices: An experiment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-061, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Brünner, Tobias & Levinsky, Rene, 2020. "Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224618, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Peterson, Hikaru H. & Bernard, John C. & Fox, John A. (Sean) & Peterson, Jeffrey M., 2013. "Japanese Consumers' Valuation of Rice and Pork from Domestic, U.S., and Other Origins," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 1-14, April.

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