Managing diversity by creating team identity
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992.
"An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," NBER Working Papers 3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Working Papers 647, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S. & Spiegel, M., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbitration Systems," Papers 55, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbritation Systems," Working papers 562, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Charles N. Noussair & Charles R. Plott & Raymond G. Riezman, 2013.
"An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 299-328,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Noussair, Charles N & Plott, Charles R & Riezman, Raymond G, 1995. "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 462-491, June.
- Noussair, Charles & Plott, Charles & Riezman, Raymond., "undated". "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," Working Papers 799, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997.
"Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-341, June.
- Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994. "Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Kachelmeier, Steven J. & Shehata, Mohamed, 1992. "Culture and competition: A laboratory market comparison between China and the West," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 145-168, October.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
- Wit, Arjaan P. & Wilke, Henk A. M., 1992. "The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-151, March.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
- Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
- Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-188, April.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2019.
"Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 1-32, November.
- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2014. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," CESifo Working Paper Series 5131, CESifo.
- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Economics working papers 2017-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Fahn, Matthias & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 42, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2003. "Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 287-318.
- Gjedrem, William Gilje & Kvaløy, Ola, 2020.
"Relative performance feedback to teams,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
- William Gilje Gjedrem & Ola Kvaløy, 2018. "Relative Performance Feedback to Teams," CESifo Working Paper Series 6871, CESifo.
- Craig A. Depken II & Lisa E. Haglund, 2011.
"Peer Effects in Team Sports: Empirical Evidence From NCAA Relay Teams,"
Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 3-19, February.
- Craig A. Depken, II & Lisa E. Haglund, 2007. "Peer Effects in Team Sports: Empirical Evidence from NCAA Relay Teams," Working Papers 0729, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Bartke, Simon & Gelhaar, Felix, 2018. "When does team remuneration work? An experimental study on interactions between workplace contexts," Kiel Working Papers 2105, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Román, Francisco J., 2009. "An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity, product quality, and absenteeism," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 589-618, July.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2008.
"Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms,"
Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 410-440.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007. "Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms," Discussion Papers 2007/27, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023. "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers 23-1421, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2024.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2006.
"Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts,"
Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 139-170, January.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2005. "Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts," Discussion Papers 2005/7, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Laurence E. Lynn Jr. & Carolyn J. Hill, 2001. "Producing Human Services: Why Do Agencies Collaborate?," JCPR Working Papers 219, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- Koch Alexander K & Morgenstern Albrecht, 2010.
"Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-40, March.
- Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht, 2009. "Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 4039, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
- Aditya U. Kulkarni & Christian Wernz, 2020. "Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 307-329, May.
- Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2011. "Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-25, August.
- Breton, Michele & St-Amour, Pascal & Vencatachellum, Desire, 2003.
"Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 875-905, March.
- Michele Breton, Pascal St-Amour and D. Vencatachellum, 2001. "Dynamic Production Teams with Strategic Behavior," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 89, Society for Computational Economics.
- Michael Waldman, 2012.
"Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011.
"Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330,
Elsevier.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Breton, Michèle & St-Amour, Pascal & Vencatachellum, Désiré, 1998.
"Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism,"
Cahiers de recherche
9808, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Breton, M. & St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D., 1998. "Birds of a Feather : Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Papers 9808, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
- Breton, M. & St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D., 1998. "Birds of a Feather: Teams as a Screening Mechanism," Papers 98-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-577, August.
- John Brehm & Scott Gates, 1994. "When Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 323-343, July.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:58:y:2005:i:3:p:371-392. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.