A comment on indentured servitude: in response to Kritikos and Bolle -- February 15th, 1998
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Cited by:
- Kritikos, Alexander S., 2000. "Indenture: an institution for a credible commitment without extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 397-403, November.
- Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 2000. "Indenture: a viable contract for a sequential one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma: A reply to Holt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 137-139, May.
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