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On the incidence of profit sharing

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  • Drago, Robert
  • Turnbull, Geoffrey K.

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  • Drago, Robert & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "On the incidence of profit sharing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 129-138, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:31:y:1996:i:1:p:129-138
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Freeman, Richard B. & Weitzman, Martin L., 1987. "Bonuses and employment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 168-194, June.
    2. Booth, Laurence D, 1983. "Total Price Uncertainty and the Theory of the Competitive Firm," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(198), pages 183-191, May.
    3. Robert Drago & John S. Heywood, 1994. "The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data," Labor and Demography 9402001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Feb 1994.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
    6. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Measures of Risk Aversion and Comparative Statics of Industry Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 524-529, June.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    9. James Chelius & Robert S. Smith, 1990. "Profit Sharing and Employment Stability," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 256-2-273-, April.
    10. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    11. Cooper, Russell, 1988. "Will Share Contracts Increase Economic Welfare?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 138-154, March.
    12. Andrew F. Daughety, 1985. "Reconsidering Cournot: The Cournot Equilibrium is Consistent," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 368-379, Autumn.
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