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The Tragedy of the Commons revisited Identifying behavioral principles

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  • Ito, Masaru
  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • Une, Masashi

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  • Ito, Masaru & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Une, Masashi, 1995. "The Tragedy of the Commons revisited Identifying behavioral principles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 311-335, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:311-335
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
    2. Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1992. "Introduction to Experimental Economics," Introductory Chapters, in: Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
    3. Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim, 1993. "The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 426-444, April.
    4. Roy Gardner & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 335-358, July.
    5. Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2008. "Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers of BETA 2008-21, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    2. Tatsuyoshi, S. & Nakamura, H., 1995. "The 'Spite' Dilema in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 0370, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping With The Tragedy Of The Commons: Game Structure And Design Of Rules," Post-Print cirad-01002167, HAL.
    4. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yutaka Kobayashi, 2014. "The Instability of the Nash Equilibrium in Common-Pool Resources," Working Papers SDES-2014-5, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Oct 2014.
    5. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Junyi Shen & Xiangdong Qin & Kenju Akai, 2007. "The Spite Dilemma Revisited: Comparison between Chinese and Japanese," OSIPP Discussion Paper 07E004, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
    7. Torben Klarl, 2013. "Market dynamics, dynamic resource management and environmental policy in the context of (strong) sustainability," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 861-888, September.
    8. Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June.
    9. Cason, Timothy N. & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko & Yokotani, Konomu, 2004. "Non-excludable public good experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 81-102, October.
    10. Jean-Philippe Atzenhoffer, 2010. "A Note on Imitation-Based Competition in Common-Pool Resources," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 299-304, October.
    11. Lasserre, Pierre & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2003. "A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 29-45, January.
    12. Saijo, T. & Yamato, T. & Yokotani, K. & Cason, T.N., 2000. "Voluntary Participation Game Experiments with a Non-Excludable Public Good: Is Spitefulness a Source of Cooperation?," ISER Discussion Paper 0494, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv & Kockesen, Levent, 1997. "Interdependent Preference Formation," Working Papers 97-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    14. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.

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