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Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India

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  • Afridi, Farzana
  • Bhattacharya, Sourav
  • Dhillon, Amrita
  • Solan, Eilon

Abstract

In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Afridi, Farzana & Bhattacharya, Sourav & Dhillon, Amrita & Solan, Eilon, 2024. "Electoral competition, electoral uncertainty and corruption: Theory and evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124002385
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Electoral competition; Uncertainty; Audit; Accountability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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