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The Countervailing Effects of Competition on Public Goods Provision: When Bargaining Inefficiencies Lead to Bad Outcomes

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  • GOTTLIEB, JESSICA
  • KOSEC, KATRINA

Abstract

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas.

Suggested Citation

  • Gottlieb, Jessica & Kosec, Katrina, 2019. "The Countervailing Effects of Competition on Public Goods Provision: When Bargaining Inefficiencies Lead to Bad Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 88-107, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:01:p:88-107_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhihong Zeng & Chen You, 2022. "The Price of Becoming a City: Decentralization and Air Pollution—The Evidence from the Policy of County-to-City Upgrade in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(23), pages 1-18, November.
    2. Somdeep Chatterjee & Pushkar Maitra & Manhar Manchanda, 2024. "The Relevant Third: Threat of Coalition and Economic Development," Monash Economics Working Papers 2024-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Farzana Afridi, & Sourav Bhattacharya, & Amrita Dhillon, & Eilon Solan,, 2021. "Electoral Competition, Accountability and Corruption:Theory and Evidence from India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 569, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Kailthya, Subham & Kambhampati, Uma, 2022. "Political competition and public healthcare: Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    5. Wang, Nan & Akimoto, Keigo & Nemet, Gregory F., 2021. "What went wrong? Learning from three decades of carbon capture, utilization and sequestration (CCUS) pilot and demonstration projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    6. Kosec, Katrina & Song, Jie & Zhao, Hongdi, 2021. "Bringing Power to the People or the Well-Connected? Evidence from Ethiopia on the Gendered Effects of Decentralizing Service Delivery," 2021 Conference, August 17-31, 2021, Virtual 315258, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    7. Mequanint B. Melesse & Amos Nyangira Tirra & Yabibal M. Walle & Michael Hauser, 2023. "Understanding the Determinants of Aspirations in Rural Tanzania: Does Financial Literacy Matter?," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 35(6), pages 1294-1321, December.

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