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The economics of military innovation under anarchy: The case of the Ukrainian Civil War of 1917–1921

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  • Maltsev, Vladimir

Abstract

This paper argues that anarchic societies can successfully engage in military innovation. To do so, it explores the novel case of the Ukrainian civil war of 1917–21 and the anarchist movement of Nestor Makhno. The anarchists’ primary military innovation was the tachanka, a sprung-wheel cart that was pulled by four horses and featured a machine gun platform, which allowed for firing on the go. Tachanka formed the core of Makhno's army and enabled it to achieve a multitude of crushing victories against numerically superior state armies. Makhno's forces were able to successfully innovate for three reasons. First, the anarchists were incentivized to substitute innovative capital combinations for labor because of their small numbers and large territory to defend. Second, the anarchists used their local knowledge and spread their influence in southeastern Ukraine, the only region with an abundance of a specific asset needed for tachanka-centered innovation: the sprung-wheel cart. Third, the cooperation of Ukrainian peasants secured through social closeness and norms allowed the anarchists to create an innovative system of horse-changing stations, through which tachankas retained top mobility. My analysis adds to the literature on military innovation and innovation without the state, and it has implications for modern times, particularly amid the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as it shows that even with the potential for state collapse, military innovation can continue.

Suggested Citation

  • Maltsev, Vladimir, 2023. "The economics of military innovation under anarchy: The case of the Ukrainian Civil War of 1917–1921," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 180-190.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:210:y:2023:i:c:p:180-190
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anarchy; Military innovation; Ukraine; Russia; Makhno; Tachanka;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N94 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: 1913-

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