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Can the rawlsian veil of ignorance foster tax compliance? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

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  • Klaser, Klaudijo
  • Mittone, Luigi

Abstract

Next to the traditional deterministic mechanisms such as formal audits and material punishments, the behavioural literature has identified several psychological variables which can positively influence agents’ attitudes and encourage them to abide by tax rules. Within the ‘slippery slope’ theoretical frame, our study looks at the psychological effects of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance on voluntary tax compliance. Testing our predictions through a laboratory experiment we found that, compared to an ‘unveiled’ procedure, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance does not produce any general remarkable effect in terms of tax compliance. We only observe some changes in the compliance path – which becomes smoother over time – when focusing on low-income and high-income subjects.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaser, Klaudijo & Mittone, Luigi, 2022. "Can the rawlsian veil of ignorance foster tax compliance? Evidence from a laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 99-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:99-113
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.05.018
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