Mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.019
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Cited by:
- repec:ers:journl:v:vi:y:2018:i:3:p:98-114 is not listed on IDEAS
- Asma Arif & Mujahid Hussain, 2018. "The Role of Governance and Political institutions for Budget Deficit for Low and High Income Countries: A Panel Data Analysis," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 3), pages 357-366.
- Asma Arif & Mujahid Hussain, 2018. "Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Budget Deficits Volatility: A Panel Data Analysis," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(3), pages 98-114.
- Garnov & A. & Zvyagin & L. & Sviridova & O., 2019. "System Data Analysis: Innovative Technologies, Methods and Techniques," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(Special 1), pages 26-39.
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More about this item
Keywords
D82; H62; Fiscal policy rules; Constitutional choice; Mechanism design;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
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