Leaping into the dark: A model of policy gambles
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2022.12.001
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More about this item
Keywords
Policy uncertainty; Electoral competition; Multiple equilibria; Political consensus;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
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