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Trial and Error? Reelection Concerns and Policy Experimentation during the US Welfare Reform

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  • Gathmann, Christina
  • Boyer, Pierre

Abstract

We study the political determinants of policy experimentation during the US welfare reform. Among other changes, this reform shifted the autonomy to implement welfare policies from the federal government to the individual states. In line the predictions from a political agency model, we find that (i) governors with high initial reputation among voters experiment less with welfare policies; (ii) governors with lower reelection concerns experiment more; (iii) governors with little experience are more likely to revert an experiment, but are also more likely to stick to a policy experiment with high potential gains. Overall our findings suggest that reelection concerns play an important role for policy experimentation and reversals.

Suggested Citation

  • Gathmann, Christina & Boyer, Pierre, 2015. "Trial and Error? Reelection Concerns and Policy Experimentation during the US Welfare Reform," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112844, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112844
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    Cited by:

    1. Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon, 2016. "Political disagreement and information in elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 390-412.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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