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Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-economic Equilibria

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  • Roberto Chang

Abstract

We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed. (JEL D72, F34, O17, O19)

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Chang, 2010. "Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-economic Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1759-1777, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1759-77
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1759
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Scholl, Almuth, 2017. "The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 37-53.
    2. Prein, Timm M. & Scholl, Almuth, 2021. "The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Anand, Kartik & Gai, Prasanna & König, Philipp Johann, 2020. "Leaping into the dark: A theory of policy gambles," Discussion Papers 07/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Cáceres, Neila & Malone, Samuel W., 2015. "Optimal Weather Conditions, Economic Growth, and Political Transitions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 16-30.
    5. Cáceres, Neila & Malone, Samuel W., 2013. "Forecasting leadership transitions around the world," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 575-591.
    6. Nicolas Gavoille & Katharina Hofer, 2021. "Capital Controls and Electoral Cycles," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(2), pages 275-324, June.
    7. Scholl, Almuth, 2024. "The politics of redistribution and sovereign default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    8. Adam Honig, 2020. "Elections and Capital Flows," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2-3), pages 471-503, March.
    9. Bussière, M., 2013. "In Defense of Early Warning Signals," Working papers 420, Banque de France.
    10. Anand, Kartik & Gai, Prasanna & König, Philipp J., 2023. "Leaping into the dark: A model of policy gambles," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 457-476.
    11. Qingyuan Li & Edward L. Maydew & Richard H. Willis & Li Xu, 2022. "Corporate tax behavior and political uncertainty: Evidence from national elections around the world," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(9-10), pages 1605-1641, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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