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Taxation and evasion in the presence of extortion by organized crime

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  • Alexeev, Michael
  • Janeba, Eckhard
  • Osborne, Stefan

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  • Alexeev, Michael & Janeba, Eckhard & Osborne, Stefan, 2004. "Taxation and evasion in the presence of extortion by organized crime," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 375-387, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:32:y:2004:i:3:p:375-387
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    1. Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 10, pages 335-359, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufman & Andrei Shleifer, 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(2), pages 159-240.
    3. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2007. "Courts and Relational Contracts," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Erik Berglöf & Gérard Roland (ed.), The Economics of Transition, chapter 8, pages 243-297, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 637-658, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara G. Katz & Joel Owen, 2007. "Political Uncertainty and Crime in Transition Economies," Working Papers 07-3, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Riccardo Novaro & Massimiliano Piacenza & Gilberto Turati, 2022. "Does money laundering inflate residential house prices? Evidence from the Italian provincial markets," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 672-691, November.
    3. Jiancai Pi & Pengqing Zhang, 2020. "Organized crime and wage inequality," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(3), pages 344-361, July.
    4. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2017. "A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 227-245, October.
    5. Ethan Bueno De Mesquita & Catherine Hafer, 2008. "Public Protection Or Private Extortion?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, March.
    6. Catherine Hafer & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 2005. "Commitment Problems and the Political Economy of States and Mafias," 2005 Meeting Papers 812, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Escalante, Edwar E., 2020. "Night watchers and terrorists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 116-131.
    8. Barbara G. Katz, 2010. "Exploring Political Uncertainty's Impact on Crime in Transition," Working Papers 10-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    9. Guerino Ardizzi & Carmelo Petraglia & Massimiliano Piacenza & Friedrich Schneider & Gilberto Turati, 2014. "Money Laundering as a Crime in the Financial Sector: A New Approach to Quantitative Assessment, with an Application to Italy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(8), pages 1555-1590, December.
    10. Katz, Barbara G. & Owen, Joel, 2013. "Exploring tax evasion in the context of political uncertainty," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 141-154.
    11. Lim, King Yoong & Morris, Diego, 2020. "The economics of the illicit drugs-for-guns trade and growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 218-232.
    12. Luca Salvadori, 2015. "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the Basque country," ERSA conference papers ersa15p1465, European Regional Science Association.
    13. Guerino Ardizzi & Carmelo Petraglia & Massimiliano Piacenza & Friedrich Schneider & Gilberto Turati, 2013. "Money Laundering as a Financial Sector Crime - A New Approach to Measurement, with an Application to Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4127, CESifo.
    14. Giovanni Bernardo & Irene Brunetti & Mehmet Pinar & Thanasis Stengos, 2021. "Measuring the presence of organized crime across Italian provinces: a sensitivity analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 31-95, February.
    15. Durnev, Art & Fauver, Larry, 2008. "Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance when States are Predatory," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-12, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    16. Bouwe R. Dijkstra, 2011. "Good and Bad Equilibria with the Informal Sector," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 668-685, December.
    17. Ausloos, Marcel & Cerqueti, Roy & Mir, Tariq A., 2017. "Data science for assessing possible tax income manipulation: The case of Italy," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 238-256.
    18. Balletta, Luigi & Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2023. "The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1109-1141.
    19. Barbara G. Katz & Joel Owen, 2009. "Are property rights enough? Re‐evaluating a big‐bang claim1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 17(1), pages 75-96, January.
    20. Tariq Ahmad Mir & Marcel Ausloos & Roy Cerqueti, 2014. "Benford's law predicted digit distribution of aggregated income taxes: the surprising conformity of Italian cities and regions," Papers 1410.2890, arXiv.org.
    21. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2015. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    22. Pääkkönen, Jenni, 2008. "Optimal law enforcement and welfare in the presence of organized crime," BOFIT Discussion Papers 30/2008, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    23. Art Durnev & Vihang Errunza & Alexander Molchanov, 2009. "Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 40(9), pages 1533-1562, December.
    24. Barbara G. Katz, 2009. "Crime and Uncertain Punishment in Transition Economies," Working Papers 09-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    25. Antony W. Dnes & Nuno Garoupa, 2010. "Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 517-529, November.

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