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Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy

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  • Douglas A. Hibbs
  • Violeta Piculescu

Abstract

How do government‐supplied institutional benefits and the taxation and regulation of producers affect the propensity of private firms to enter the unofficial economy and evade taxation? We propose a model in which the incentive of firms to operate underground depends on tax rates relative to firm‐specific thresholds of tax toleration that are decisively affected by quality of governance—in particular by the presence of high‐grade institutions delivering services enhancing official production that anchor profit‐maximizing firms to the official economy. Some key predictions of the model concerning the determinants of firms' tax toleration and tax compliance receive broad support from empirical analyses of enterprise‐level data from the World Bank's World Business Environment Surveys.

Suggested Citation

  • Douglas A. Hibbs & Violeta Piculescu, 2010. "Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Government Affects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Unofficial Economy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 18-33, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:54:y:2010:i:1:p:18-33
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00415.x
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    2. Cummins, Mark & Gillanders, Robert, 2020. "Greasing the Turbines? Corruption and access to electricity in Africa," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    3. Joël CARIOLLE, 2018. "Corruption determinants in developing and transition economies: Insights from a multi-level analysis," Working Papers P229, FERDI.
    4. Zrinka Lukač, 2023. "Optimal tax policy for single homogeneous commodity on n markets with export costs as a Stackelberg game," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 31(3), pages 873-890, September.
    5. Pedroni, Florencia Verónica & Briozzo, Anahí & Pesce, Gabriela, 2022. "Firm-level determinants of business tax evasion in emerging economies: the case of Argentina [Determinantes microeconómicos de la evasión tributaria empresarial en economías emergentes: el caso de ," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 34(1), pages 83-117, December.
    6. Gokalp, Omer N. & Lee, Seung-Hyun & Peng, Mike W., 2017. "Competition and corporate tax evasion: An institution-based view," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 258-269.
    7. Florencia Verónica Pedroni & Anahí Briozzo & Gabriela Pesce, 2019. "¿Por qué no declarar todo? Determinantes de la subfacturación empresarial en la Argentina," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4186, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    8. Lago-Peñas, Ignacio & Lago-Peñas, Santiago, 2010. "The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: Evidence from European countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 441-453, December.
    9. Anat Gofen, 2015. "Reconciling policy dissonance: patterns of governmental response to policy noncompliance," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 48(1), pages 3-24, March.
    10. Adamu Jibir & Musa Abdu & Tasiu Muhammad, 2020. "Analysis of Tax Compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Firm-Level Study," Econometric Research in Finance, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, vol. 5(2), pages 119-142, December.
    11. World Bank & International Finance Corporation, "undated". "Doing Business in the East African Community 2011," World Bank Publications - Reports 27390, The World Bank Group.
    12. Abdixhiku, Lumir & Krasniqi, Besnik & Pugh, Geoff & Hashi, Iraj, 2017. "Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 354-366.
    13. Raitano, Michele & Fantozzi, Roberto, 2015. "Political cycle and reported labour incomes in Italy: Quasi-experimental evidence on tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 269-280.

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