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Nonmarket strategies of media enterprises in the Mexican television industry

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  • Vázquez-Maguirre, Mario
  • Hartmann, Andreas M.

Abstract

This paper describes and analyzes the nonmarket strategies of the Mexican television duopoly in order to reach an understanding of how firms gain and maintain first-mover advantages by influencing policymakers. Clear evidence shows that the incumbent duopoly has used its nonmarket strategies to accrue wealth and prevent new competitors from entering the Mexican television industry. Furthermore, a model of self-reinforcement of first-mover advantages exists and leads to the influence of the duopoly's nonmarket strategies on public welfare and other ethical issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Vázquez-Maguirre, Mario & Hartmann, Andreas M., 2013. "Nonmarket strategies of media enterprises in the Mexican television industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1743-1749.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:66:y:2013:i:10:p:1743-1749
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.01.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bimbo Onaolapo Adejare & Ekpenyong Ekpenyong Udofia & Gbemi Oladipo Olaore, 2023. "Strategy integration, sustainable drivers of firm internationalization performance—Moderated by environmental uncertainty and firm capabilities," Journal of International Entrepreneurship, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 301-328, September.
    2. Jordi McKenzie, 2023. "The economics of movies (revisited): A survey of recent literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 480-525, April.
    3. Raventós, Pedro & Ospina, José Miguel, 2013. "Strategic management in Latin America: Introduction to a special section," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(10), pages 1725-1727.
    4. Wu Wei & Xuan Zhao & Mei Li & Malcolm Warner, 2016. "Integrating nonmarket and market resources, strategy and performance in Chinese enterprises: a review of the field and a resource-based empirical study," Asia Pacific Business Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 220-237, April.

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