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Trust and efficiency

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  • Chami, Ralph
  • Fullenkamp, Connel

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  • Chami, Ralph & Fullenkamp, Connel, 2002. "Trust and efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1785-1809, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:26:y:2002:i:9:p:1785-1809
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April.
    3. Lorenz, Edward, 1999. "Trust, Contract and Economic Cooperation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 23(3), pages 301-315, May.
    4. Khan, M. Ali, 2002. "On trust as a commodity and on the grammar of trust," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1719-1766, September.
    5. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-338, May.
    6. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    7. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
    8. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    9. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
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    14. Mr. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 1998/063, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
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    18. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-190, March.
    19. Chami, Ralph & Fischer, Jeffrey H, 1996. "Altruism, Matching, and Nonmarket Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 630-647, October.
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