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Altruism, Matching, and Nonmarket Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Chami, Ralph
  • Fischer, Jeffrey H

Abstract

Incomplete market insurance gives rise to nonmarket arrangements for coinsurance. The authors find that the effort altruistically linked individuals take to avoid an accident increases with the degree of altruism. If the degree of altruism is sufficiently high, an economy with nonmarket insurance yields higher social welfare than an economy without nonmarket insurance. As altruism increases, the equilibrium level of effort approaches the second-best solution without the need for costly monitoring. Coinsurance is above (below) the socially optimal level if individuals place greater weight (less weight) on their own utility than on that of their partners. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Chami, Ralph & Fischer, Jeffrey H, 1996. "Altruism, Matching, and Nonmarket Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 630-647, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:34:y:1996:i:4:p:630-47
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    Cited by:

    1. Wunder, Christoph & Heineck, Guido, 2013. "Working time preferences, hours mismatch and well-being of couples: Are there spillovers?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 244-252.
    2. Chami, Ralph & Fullenkamp, Connel, 2002. "Trust and efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1785-1809, September.
    3. Ho, Lok Sang, 1998. "A model of human nature and personal development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 271-287.
    4. Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2015. "(Why) Do self-employed parents have more children?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 297-321, June.
    5. International Monetary Fund, 2004. "Morocco: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2004/164, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Mr. Jacques Bouhga-Hagbe, 2006. "Altruism and Workers’ Remittances: Evidence from Selected Countries in the Middle East and Central Asia," IMF Working Papers 2006/130, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Dan Anderberg, 2003. "Voluntary income sharing and the design of unemployment insurance," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 16(1), pages 71-90, February.

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