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Preannouncing competitive decisions in oligopoly markets

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  • Corona, Carlos
  • Nan, Lin

Abstract

We examine a duopolistic setting in which firms can preannounce their future competitive decisions before they actually implement them. We show that there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms preannounce and overstate their future actions when uncertainty of demand is low. We find that firms choose higher real actions than the ones they would choose in the absence of preannouncements. Moreover, the real actions of both firms are single-peaked functions of their credibility. In a Cournot market, firms face a prisoner's dilemma in which preannouncing lowers firms' profits. If firms could commit not to preannounce, they would remain silent. In a Bertrand market, firms overstate their future actions to foster collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Corona, Carlos & Nan, Lin, 2013. "Preannouncing competitive decisions in oligopoly markets," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 73-90.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:56:y:2013:i:1:p:73-90
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.04.002
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    3. Chen, Gang & Rytter, Niels G.M. & Jiang, Liping & Nielsen, Peter & Jensen, Lars, 2017. "Pre-announcements of price increase intentions in liner shipping spot markets," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 109-125.
    4. Jeremy Bertomeu & Edwige Cheynel, 2015. "Asset Measurement in Imperfect Credit Markets," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 965-984, December.
    5. Zheng, Zhen & Lin, Yongjia & Yu, Xiaoou & Liu, Xinming, 2021. "Product market competition and the cost of equity capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1-9.
    6. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2015. "Competitive intelligence and disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 709-729, October.
    7. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2018. "Bricks-and-Mortar Entry by Online Retailers in the Presence of Consumer Sales Taxes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(11), pages 5220-5233, November.
    8. Hui Chen & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2022. "Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1497-1511, February.
    9. Gaoqing Zhang, 2021. "Competition and Opacity in the Financial System," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1895-1913, March.
    10. Hui Chen & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2018. "Market Exit Through Divestment—The Effect of Accounting Bias on Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 164-177, January.
    11. Jeremy Bertomeu & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2015. "Disclosure Policy and Industry Fluctuations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1292-1305, June.
    12. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Sharing managerial contract information in a vertically related market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 1037-1047, June.
    13. Kazunori Miwa, 2021. "An Experimental Study on Information Acquisition and Disclosure in a Cournot Duopoly Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    14. Kazunori Miwa, 2016. "Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2016-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

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