IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jaecon/v46y2008i1p101-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

Author

Listed:
  • Blacconiere, Walter G.
  • Johnson, Marilyn F.
  • Lewis, Melissa F.

Abstract

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.

Suggested Citation

  • Blacconiere, Walter G. & Johnson, Marilyn F. & Lewis, Melissa F., 2008. "The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 101-111, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:101-111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4101(07)00076-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John R. Graham & Michael L. Lemmon, 1998. "Measuring Corporate Tax Rates And Tax Incentives: A New Approach," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 11(1), pages 54-65, March.
    2. Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J. & Smith, Abbie, 1996. "CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 161-193, April.
    3. Perry, Tod & Zenner, Marc, 2001. "Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 453-488, December.
    4. Wayne Guay & Richard Sloan, 2003. "Accounting for Employee Stock Options," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 405-409, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Voßmerbäumer, Jan, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 125, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    2. Bronson, Scott N. & Hogan, Chris E. & Johnson, Marilyn F. & Ramesh, K., 2011. "The unintended consequences of PCAOB auditing Standard Nos. 2 and 3 on the reliability of preliminary earnings releases," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 95-114.
    3. Jan Voßmerbäumer, 2012. "Effizienzwirkungen einer Regulierung von Managergehältern durch das Steuerrecht," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 64(5), pages 536-561, August.
    4. Voßmerbäumer, Jan & Wagner, Franz W., 2013. "Steuerwirkungen betrieblicher Entgeltpolitik," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 144, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    5. Bronson, Scott N. & Hogan, Chris E. & Johnson, Marilyn F. & Ramesh, K., 2011. "The unintended consequences of PCAOB auditing Standard Nos. 2 and 3 on the reliability of preliminary earnings releases," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 95-114, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
    2. Venky Nagar, "undated". "Organizational Design Choices in Retail Banking," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 09-99, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    3. Ivana Vitanova, 2022. "CEO overconfidence and corporate tournaments," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(5), pages 1423-1438, July.
    4. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta, 2010. "Does accounting regulation enhance corporate governance? Evidence from the disclosure of share-based remuneration," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 14(4), pages 435-446, November.
    5. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation," Research Papers 1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Hutchinson, Marion & Gul, Ferdinand A., 2004. "Investment opportunity set, corporate governance practices and firm performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 595-614, September.
    7. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Corporate governance and the design of stock option programs," Papers 05-32, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    8. Prianto Budi Saptono & Gustofan Mahmud & Intan Pratiwi & Dwi Purwanto & Ismail Khozen & Lambang Wiji Imantoro & Maria Eurelia Wayan, 2024. "Book-Tax Differences during the Crisis: Does Corporate Social Responsibility Matter?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-38, August.
    9. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kenneth J. Klassen & Amin Mawani, 2000. "The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 227-262, June.
    11. Zhiguo He & Si Li & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2014. "Uncertainty, Risk, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 206-226, January.
    12. Katharine D. Drake & Ellen Engel & Melissa A. Martin, 2023. "Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 533-569, June.
    13. Robert M. Bushman & Abbie Smith, 2003. "Transparency, financial accounting information, and corporate governance," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 65-87.
    14. Christian Blecher, 2009. "Die Bilanzierung von Aktienoptionsprogrammen aus Sicht der Messperspektive," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(6), pages 603-627, September.
    15. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    16. Muurling, Rutger & Lehnert, Thorsten, 2004. "Option-based compensation: a survey," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 365-401.
    17. Merz, Alexander, 2017. "What have we learned from SFAS 123r and IFRS 2? A review of existing evidence and future research suggestions," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 14-33.
    18. Feng-Li Lin, 2016. "Executive Pay and Market Value Sensitivity," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 63(4), pages 411-424, September.
    19. Bryan Hong, 2020. "Power to the outsiders: External hiring and decision authority allocation within organizations," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(9), pages 1628-1652, September.
    20. Austan Goolsbee, 2000. "Taxes, High-Income Executives, and the Perils of Revenue Estimation in the New Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 271-275, May.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:46:y:2008:i:1:p:101-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.