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Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court

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  • Muro, Sergio
  • Chehtman, Alejandro

Abstract

Abstention theory suggests that self-interest leads voters to abstain. While this theory has been studied in different settings, abstention in courts has received scant attention. Jacobi and Kontorovich (2014) hypothesize that stare decisis renders abstention theory inapplicable to courts. We test this prediction empirically using data from the Argentine Supreme Court. Consistent with abstention theory, we show that Justices whose vote is pivotal have a lower probability of abstention than non-pivotal ones. In contrast, we fail to find evidence in support of the probability of abstention being positively related to appeals without stare decisis implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Muro, Sergio & Chehtman, Alejandro, 2020. "Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s0144818819300602
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105889
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    References listed on IDEAS

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