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Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court

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  • Caldeira, Gregory A.
  • Wright, John R.

Abstract

Participation as amicus curiae has long been an important tactic of organized interests in litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court. We analyze amicus curiae briefs filed before the decision on certiorari and assess their impact on the Court's selection of a plenary docket. We hypothesize that one or more briefs advocating or opposing certiorari increase the likelihood of its being granted. We test this hypothesis using data from the United States Reports and Briefs and Records of the United States Supreme Court for the 1982 term. The statistical analysis demonstrates that the presence of amicus curiae briefs filed prior to the decision on certiorari significantly and positively increases the chances of the justices' binding of a case over for full treatment—even after we take into account the full array of variables other scholars have hypothesized or shown to be substantial influences on the decision to grant or deny.

Suggested Citation

  • Caldeira, Gregory A. & Wright, John R., 1988. "Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1109-1127, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:04:p:1109-1127_19
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    Cited by:

    1. David Lowery & Virginia Gray, 2004. "Bias in the Heavenly Chorus," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 5-29, January.
    2. Muro, Sergio & Chehtman, Alejandro, 2020. "Law or strategic calculus? Abstention in the Argentine Supreme Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Udi Sommer, 2011. "How rational are justices on the Supreme Court of the United States? Doctrinal considerations during agenda setting," Rationality and Society, , vol. 23(4), pages 452-477, November.
    4. Mintao Nie, 2023. "IOs’ selective adoption of NGO information: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-59, January.
    5. David Lowery & Virginia Gray & Matthew Fellowes, 2005. "Sisyphus Meets the Borg," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 41-74, January.
    6. Robert J. Hume, 2007. "Administrative Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court: The Importance of Legal Signals," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(3), pages 625-649, November.
    7. Shay Lavie, 2017. "Discretionary review and undesired cases," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 265-285, October.
    8. Paul M. Collins, 2008. "Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(1), pages 143-170, March.
    9. Tom S Clark, 2016. "Scope and precedent: judicial rule-making under uncertainty," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 353-384, July.
    10. Joshua A Strayhorn, 2019. "Competing signals in the judicial hierarchy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 308-329, July.
    11. Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, 2008. "Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(3), pages 407-446, September.
    12. Maxwell Mak & Andrew H. Sidman & Udi Sommer, 2013. "Is Certiorari Contingent on Litigant Behavior? Petitioners' Role in Strategic Auditing," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 54-75, March.
    13. Schoenherr, Jessica A. & Black, Ryan C., 2019. "Friends with benefits: Case significance, amicus curiae, and agenda setting on the U.S. Supreme Court," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 43-53.
    14. Scott S. Boddery, 2019. "Signals from a politicized bar: the solicitor general as a direct litigant before the U.S. Supreme Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 194-210, June.

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