The optimal adjustment to liability when litigation is costly: A note
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DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2019.03.008
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal damages; Costly litigation; Rent seeking;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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