IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v23y2003i3p237-251.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Precautionary incentives for privately informed victims

Author

Listed:
  • Clements, Matthew T.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Clements, Matthew T., 2003. "Precautionary incentives for privately informed victims," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 237-251, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:237-251
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(03)00038-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-164, January.
    4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    5. Ben-Shahar, Omri & Harel, Alon, 1995. "Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 434-455, October.
    6. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Individual precautions to prevent theft: Private versus socially optimal behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 123-132, September.
    7. Keith N. Hylton, 1996. "Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 197-206, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim, 2008. "Optimal sanctions and endogeneity of differences in detection probabilities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 150-155, June.
    2. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2012. "Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 455-459.
    3. Eberhard Feess, 2015. "On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 79-95, February.
    4. Brishti Guha, 2015. "“Inferiority” complex? Policing, private precautions and crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 97-106, February.
    5. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guha, Brishti & Guha, Ashok S., 2012. "Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 455-459.
    2. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.
    3. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
    4. Eberhard Feess, 2015. "On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 79-95, February.
    5. Brishti Guha, 2015. "“Inferiority” complex? Policing, private precautions and crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 97-106, February.
    6. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.
    7. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77.
    8. Philip A. Curry & Matthew Doyle, 2012. "Social Welfare and the Benefits to Crime," Working Papers 1205, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2012.
    9. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(4), pages 343-359, September.
    10. Albert Choi & Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 323-354, June.
    11. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2010. "Deterrence from self-protection measures in the ‘market model’ of crime: dynamic panel data estimates from employment in private security occupations," MPRA Paper 26187, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Larcom Shaun, 2013. "Accounting for Legal Pluralism: The Impact of Pre-colonial Institutions on Crime," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 25-59, November.
    13. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Modern Maritime Piracy," Working papers 2014-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    14. Baumann, Florian & Denter, Philipp & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Hide or show? Endogenous observability of private precautions against crime when property value is private information," DICE Discussion Papers 115, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pc:p:3529-3571 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Sophie Bienenstock, 2019. "The Deterrent Effect of French Liability Law: the Example of Abusive Contract Terms," Post-Print hal-03222207, HAL.
    17. Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sorgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 4/2013, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    18. Larcom Shaun & Swanson Timothy, 2015. "Documenting Legal Dissonance: Legal Pluralism in Papua New Guinea," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 25-50, March.
    19. Chiu, W. Henry & Madden, Paul, 1998. "Burglary and income inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 123-141, July.
    20. Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015. "Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
    21. Salvatore Piccolo & Piero Tedeschi & Giovanni Ursino, 2018. "Deceptive Advertising with Rational Buyers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1291-1310, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:237-251. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.