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What motivates voters’ support for eminent domain reform: Ownership, vulnerability, or ideology?

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  • Hoehn, John P.
  • Adanu, Kwami

Abstract

The analysis evaluates factors that motivate voter support for eminent domain reform. Economic models emphasize property ownership as a motivation for eminent domain restrictions (Fleck & Hanssen, 2010; Lamoreaux, 2011). Other research and court opinions point to ideology and vulnerability to takings as motivations for eminent domain reform. The empirical analysis tests these hypotheses using data from state-level referenda that responded to the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London. Property ownership, income, economic vulnerability and ideology have significant impacts on the odds of voting in favor of reform. Ethnic and educational factors do not have significant effects on reform outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoehn, John P. & Adanu, Kwami, 2014. "What motivates voters’ support for eminent domain reform: Ownership, vulnerability, or ideology?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 90-99.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:37:y:2014:i:c:p:90-99
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.07.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dietz, Robert D. & Haurin, Donald R., 2003. "The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 401-450, November.
    2. Lamoreaux, Naomi R., 2011. "The Mystery of Property Rights: A U.S. Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 275-306, June.
    3. Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Government Takings: Determinants of Eminent Domain," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 201-219.
    4. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2010. "Repeated adjustment of delegated powers and the history of eminent domain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 99-112, June.
    5. Carter, Steven, 2011. "Housing tenure choice and the dual income household," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 159-170, September.
    6. Lopez Edward J. & Jewell R. Todd & Campbell Noel D., 2009. "Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 101-135, April.
    7. Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, 2008. "Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(4), pages 713-749, December.
    8. Deacon, Robert T & Shapiro, Perry, 1975. "Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed Through Voting on Referenda," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 943-955, December.
    9. Elaine B. Sharp & Donald Haider-Markel, 2008. "At the Invitation of the Court: Eminent Domain Reform in State Legislatures in the Wake of the Kelo Decision," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 38(3), pages 556-575, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronit Levine‐Schnur, 2023. "Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre‐ and post‐Kelo," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 449-468, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eminent domain; Takings; Public use clause; Property rights; History; Voter behavior; Referenda; Fifth Amendment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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