The Problem with the Holdout Problem
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2012-0031
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- López Edward J. & Clark J.R., 2013. "The Problem with the Holdout Problem," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 151-167, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
holdouts; eminent domain; takings; market failure; government failure;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
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